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According to a generally accepted conception, members of a nation foster their natio-
nal identity through assorting their memories of the past, elaborating and preserving 
their symbols collectively. We have to look for the original unity forming the basis of 
national unity either in the cohesive force of common origin and residence, or in the 
self-conscious contracts of the individuals, or in both. The European Union as such 
does not have sovereignty; those of the Member States overrule its legislative and 
executive institutions. Perhaps we can speak about the European Union as a commu-
nity on a cultural basis. This will raise the question of multiculturalism. Recently an 
interesting polemic has been developing on the concept and role of Leitkultur. In an-
tiquity the Imperium Romanum, in the Middle Ages the Republica Christiana seem 
to have been the multicultural forerunners of the European Union. 
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Certain individuals can be successful in performing such a common activity only if 
they have experienced some kind of togetherness beforehand. People who do not belong 
together will not assort memories of the past together, or elaborate or preserve their 
symbols or traditions collectively. Typical landmarks and expressions of identity like 
I am Hungarian or I am Dutch, which we naturally often encounter, must have some 
kind of a basis for the development of identity. Subjective cognate beliefs are also the 
facts that must be interpreted in accordance with this – however, an approach, whose 
sole objective is to register the data without trying to achieve any kind of interpretation, 
cannot be scientific. The demonstration of the belonging to one nation may well be the 
expression of a subjective cognate belief but it must be based on a previously developed 
common ground of unity or togetherness, which is closely connected to it. 
According to Ferdinand Tönnies’s theory (Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft 1887), 
the family and the house(hold) are the basic patterns of any kind of organic community. 
Modifications and specific interrelations of these patterns then appear in the traditional 
types of communities like clans, tribes, nations or villages, towns, countries. In all these 
patterns of community, the comprehensive unity of which is secured by the common faith 
(of the folk) and the institutions of the clergy, it is the common origin and residence 
that represent the basis of the community. Humans according to Tönnies will however, 
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contact each other not only organically but also mechanically, so being able to develop 
an intelligent society in spite of the individuals originally being alien to one another. 
Their systems of interrelation can then be characterised with terms like market, civil 
society, or political state. This was the academic concept of all the theories regarding 
the “social contract” of modern history and is expressed in Georg Hegel’s philosophy 
of law (Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts 1821: § 258). According to Hegel, the 
individuals who leave a family contact one another in the network of connections of the 
civil society, but only obtain their real rights and ethos through being members of that 
society, by which their unity becomes a contract regardless how exactly it came about. 
Not only did Hegel characterize the family as the cell of civil society that logically pre-
cedes the systems of connections forming in society (different relations exist of course 
within and outside the cell), but also he labelled any organic community resembling the 
family as one belonging to premodern actualities that come before modern civil society. 
This, however, was also known to Tönnies.
We have to look for the original unity forming the basis of national unity either in 
the cohesive force of common origin and residence, or in the self-conscious contracts 
of the individuals, or in both. In fact: in Tönnies it is the people and the country having 
specific cultural tradition, in Hegel the state having specific political independence that 
appear as nations observed from the outside. Friedrich Meinecke, however, unites the 
two abstract categories developing his theory on the difference and connection between 
the so-called culture-nation (Kulturnation) and nation-state (Staatsnation) (Meinecke 
1907: 1–19; 20–35). According to Meinecke, nations in the first approximation can be 
conceptualised as big life-communities formed by history whose unity is secured by 
the common residence, origin or amalgamation, common language and spiritual life, 
and common state or political alliance. This does not, of course, mean that all nations 
should or could share all the characteristics enumerated above. Meinecke differen tiates 
two basic types: the culture-nation on the one hand, in which the common basis is the 
common culture experienced collectively, and the nation-state on the other hand in 
which the common basis is the political constitution formed historically. Neverthe-
less, these two basic types can and will transform into each other. There are nations 
that have been both culture-nations and nation-states since the beginning (France and 
England). It may happen that the nation-state loses its independence and continues to 
exist as a  culture-nation, like Poland at certain times, and there are culture-nations who 
successfully fight for the status of the nation-state like Germany or Italy. It very often 
depends on circumstances or conditions for a certain group of people to belong to a na-
tion-state and who also want to belong to a different culture-nation (Meinecke 1907: 2–5). 
Thus we must agree with Ernest Renan, who, in connection with the Alsatians, argues 
that to secure the existence of a nation we symbolically need a referendum on a daily 
basis in his essay “Qu’est-ce q’une nation?” (1882). 
According to Meinecke, both the nation-state and the culture-nation had a period of 
early development when the nation-state existed without any real content and the cul-
ture-nation was merely vegetating. The real development of the state took place when 
the framework of the nation-state had become impregnated with elements of culture 
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and those of the culture-nation had found their ways to become integrated in the institu-
tions of the state. In this process the elements of the nation-state helped the development 
of the culture-nation and the values of the culture-nation facilitated the evolution of 
the nation-state. The concept of the nation, however, is a modern notion, the evolution of 
which is closely related to the development of modern individualism. Earlier the indivi-
dual had been connected to premodern communities as Tönnies argues, but now the indi-
vidual, as Hegel put it, became independent and needs community provided by the nation. 
In the end, Meinecke’s theory suggests that the normal existence of a nation assumes the 
presence of both the nation-state and the culture-nation (Meinecke 1907: 12–14).
In our modern civil societies, the prevailing opinion is that the unity and the basis of 
a nation are determined by the common political institutions such as constitution and 
common political culture; while common origin and language, though very important, 
only contribute to them emotionally. Both factors have their significance: with a formu-
lation of Immanuel Kant, emotions are blind without institutions and institutions are 
empty without emotions. Typical ideals of such concept of the nation are represented 
by Switzerland on the one hand and the US on the other because the Hegelian ideal of 
the political contract, which unites citizens on a moral basis, is best reflected in the 
constitutional existence and its spiritual reflections in these two countries.  
This ideal has usually been referred to as republicanism since it was coined by the 
three paramount authors who signed their publications as “Publius” (or “The Federa-
list”). They confronted Jean Jacques Rousseau’s “pure” democracy with the concept of 
representative democracy (republic or commonwealth) based on a kind of pluralism in the 
framework of which different interests – such as those of the federalist–regional – can be 
balanced in the constitution. The words republic and republicanism do not refer to a specific 
kind of government. These principles can also be effective in a constitutional monarchy, as 
the crown is the symbol of the nation’s sovereignty (Alexander Hamilton, James Madison 
and John Jay used the pseudonym Publius to write their series of articles called Federalist 
Papers, 1787–1788; the above-mentioned differentiation can be read in Article 10). The 
authors had followed a very old tradition. Aristotle made a difference between the ideal 
political system of politeia (res publica) and the degenerated democracy. (It was only 
the malignant experience of the Hellenistic and Roman Caesarisms that resulted in the 
nostalgia towards the old system of democracy and it was Polybios who compared the by 
then positive term of democracy with the degenerated ochlocratia # mobocracy). That is 
why Dolf Sternberger and Jürgen Habermas kept emphasising that for Germany, which 
from the concept of culture-nation, fell into the cul-de-sac of racism and only through 
tremendous hardships managed to develop a true democracy, after the 2nd World War 
the only possible patriotism that did not create antagonism with the West was that of the 
constitution (Verfassungspatriotismus) (Habermas 1986).
Embarking on the investigation of European identity, I must emphasize, first, that 
being a European does not mean having European identity simply because one inhabits 
this continent. I am going to use the term Europe in the sense of European unity that is 
referring to the European Union (EU), which of course will at once state the question 
whether those European countries that are not Member States of the EU can be included 
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in the concept above. The answer is naturally yes and the application of the concept is 
only justified if all the founding members, recently accessed countries and potential can-
didates are equally understood when the concept of Europe is referred to. According to 
the well-known statement by General President Charles de Gaulle, which generated a 
geopolitical concept from a geographical commonplace, Europe spreads from the Atlan-
tic Ocean to the Ural Mountains. There are two countries in this area, Russia and Turkey 
whose being part of Europe is problematic due to their Asian commitments and influence. 
Russia, however, used to be the member of the system of the Republica Christiana in the 
Middle Ages just like Byzantium, which is commonly accepted by the intellectuals in 
Turkey as the forerunner of the present Turkish state. If, however, we want to conceptua-
lize Europe as representative of the modern Western civilization – as it is quite common 
nowadays – it spreads from Vancouver to Vladivostok. So America must be considered 
part of such a “Great Europe”, but then what about Russia and Turkey? Before answering 
the question, let us examine what features of the nation-state or national identity apply 
to the EU. In no way can the EU be regarded as a nation-state and it can be questioned 
whether she is a state at all. There is no denying that the EU has a well-defined territory 
with solid ground and confinable borders, as well as unique political characteristics. She 
has a customs union and common currency – though not valid in all Member States – of 
her own. She has her own Parliament and Constitution, though significantly different 
from the corresponding institutions of the Member States. 
The EU as such does not have sovereignty; those of the Member States overrule 
her legislative and executive institutions. Although the Member States have dedicated 
some of their sovereignty to the Union, in practice they have kept its majority to them-
selves. We have known since Jean Bodin and Thomas Hobbes, however, that the most 
important attributive of a real state is its sovereignty. Sovereignty is the impelling force 
and animator by which “the great Leviathan” fills with life and without it the state is 
nothing but spiritless machinery. In fact, the EU is an association of several practically 
sovereign states. It is not a federation; its parliament or government does not overrule 
those of the Member States’, as the Bundestag or the Bundesregierung does in the 
case of the different local governments in Germany. Their position is more similar to 
that of the central institutions of the 18th century confederations of Switzerland or the 
Netherlands, which were rendered to overrule without any existing power practically 
sovereign cantons or regions. For the time being, we cannot speak of a real political 
community, at least not in the definite sense, such as in the above-mentioned case of the 
existing political frameworks of the early nation-state. Here we can only speak about it 
relatively, as about a real political community whose formation is in progress. 
Perhaps we can speak about the EU as a community on a cultural basis, as in the case 
of the culture–nation and its beginnings. Here again we have to face the question whether 
those nations, which have not yet gained accession to the union, could be segregated from 
the common cultural community of Europe. That is why we must speak about Europe as 
a cultural community in general first. Doing so we cannot avoid awakening memories of 
the Republica Christiana, which established itself into a Christian community originated 
in the ancient Greek–Roman traditions. The common faith of the Republica Christiana 
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functioned as a common religion of the peoples and gave a solid basis of a European 
cultural community to which the cultural communities of the member states can be 
compared. This concept had been so obvious for many that it was planned to be incor-
porated into the Preamble of the Constitution of the EU. In spite of all this, others, me 
included, have rejected this concept, instead arguing for a modified, secularised version. 
Europe had been “Christian” in a religious sense only in the beginning of its develop-
ment, i.e.  in the Middle Ages. Later, in the modern period, it could be called Christian 
only in an abs-tract, “cultural” sense. Furthermore, belonging to Christian culture did 
not necessarily mean (in the Middle Ages, too) the confession of the Christian faith 
or the following of its teachings even then. It could also represent a general social and 
cultural establishment, such as respect for organisation and forms of feudal state or scho-
lastic science. Modern civil society and scientism have developed from feudal state and 
scholastic science. However, they have also acquired modified and disendowed forms of 
these, and in the comprehensive system of the Enlightenment this developed into a new 
European Christian culture. 
The Christian character of the European culture does not necessarily mean that a 
good European – ein guter Europäer as Friedrich Nietzsche put it – would really be-
lieve in what they had learnt from the Credo, which they would have been able to recite 
with no difficulty, though. Those who think that Benedict de Spinoza and Voltaire, or 
Nietzsche and Karl Marx, or Martin Buber and Hannah Arendt – just to mention only 
a few – are not “good Europeans” because they are not believing Christians, well, they 
themselves can be, however, in no way in the modern, but only in a medieval sense like 
a Copt-Christian in Egypt or a Thomas-Christian in India. They are certainly Chris-
tians but have nothing to do with Europism. A Muslim, for example, a Bosnian living in 
Europe who does his best to acquire the modern spirituality of Europism will be a part 
of Europe not only geographically but spiritually as well. The condition of accession 
for Turkey is not that the faith of the population is to be Christian but how steadily its 
government secures the observance of human rights. This is a criterion for the “Chris-
tian” candidates – like Croatia – as well (and this refers to Russia, too). While medieval 
Europe can be defined and characterised with Christianity the modern one is defined 
and characterised by secularized Christianity and Enlightenment, above all the respect 
for human rights and democratic state governed by law. 
This will raise the question of multiculturalism. How multicultural can Europe be? 
Recently an interesting polemic has been developing on the concept and role of Leitkultur 
(Göhler 2005: 312). It seems inevitable that the world and Europe in it can be or rather stay 
multicultural. There must exist some common spiritual cohesive force in a political for-
mation as the example of nation-states that were not able to develop into a culture-nation 
too has taught us (Switzerland vs. Yugoslavia). The EU, as we have seen, is a confedera-
tion of sovereign nation-states that can develop into a federation in the future but unlikely 
to become a nation ever. At present, it resembles a nation-state that has its political frame-
works but they are lacking necessary emotional content. Identification with the EU and 
common European consciousness can only develop to the extent to which the citizens of 
the Member States can feel and consider, through their immediate experiences, that the 
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EU is their real common home. If this takes place, the political frameworks and institu-
tions which are rather unstable at present, will fill up with emotional content from both 
the citizens of the old and newly accessed Member States and the immigrants, provided 
they are offered real chances for integration perhaps only after several generations, and 
become more and more deep rooted and enduring. The cultivation of such common identity 
is impossible without the presence of democratic publicity. In antiquity the Imperium 
Romanum, in the Middle Ages the Republica Christiana seem to have been multicultural 
forerunners of the EU. The Imperium Romanum represented a political, the Republica 
Christiana a cultural formation. 
In both, there existed a Leitkultur and its agency a lingua franca. At present, nobody 
knows which lingua franca will help to solve rather intricate problems of communica-
tion in Europe. Leitkultur in the European Union, nevertheless, must be based on the 
political and cultural traditions of Europism (Lepsius 1999: 218).
Conclusions
National identity has political and cultural grounds: not only a common state, but also a 
common language, a common history etc., i.e. the unity of the so-called “state nation” 
and the so-called “culture nation”. The European Union has – at the moment – only 
political and economical grounds; and perhaps some historical grounds, too. The real 
European community and identity need also cultural grounds. The character of the 
Union is multinational and multicultural. But it is possible to have a “lingua franca” and 
a democratic publicity: so the European historical, cultural and political tradition can 
be the ground for European identity.
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TAUTINIS IR EUROPIETIŠKASIS TAPATUMAS
Ferenc L. Lendvai
Santrauka
Remdamasis bendrąja nuostata, esą savasis tautinis tapatumas yra puoselėjamas, 
saugant prisiminimus apie praeitį ir tobulinant jų bendruosius simbolius, straipsnio 
autorius pabrėžia vienos ar kitos tautos narių vienybės paieškų būtinybę. Būtent ji 
turėtų tapti tautinio tapatumo pagrindu, pabrėžiant istorinių tautos šaknų ir gy-
venamojo arealo bei sąmoningo tautiečių bendra(darbia)vimo svarbą. Europos 
Sąjunga, straipsnio autoriaus teigimu, nėra suvereni, ir tik tam tikroms jos narėms 
lyderėms priklauso įstatymų leidžiamoji ir vykdomoji institucijos. Todėl galbūt 
galima kalbėti apie Europos Sąjungą kaip apie bendruomenę, vienijamą tos pačios 
europietiškosios kultūros. Taip kyla multikultūralizmo klausimas. Ypač įdomi 
polemika šiuolaikinėje Europoje plėtojama, pasak straipsnio autoriaus, Leitkultur 
sampratos ir vaidmens klausimu. Europos Sąjungos pirmtakėmis lyg ir galima 
laikyti senovės Romos imperiją ir viduramžiškąją Krikščioniškąją Respubliką. 
Jos abi turėjo vadinamąją Leitkultur ir lingua franca. Dabar nežinoma, kokia 
lingua franca padėtų išspręsti itin sudėtingas komunikacijos Europoje problemas. 
Leitkultur pagrindą Europos kontinente visgi turėtų sudaryti senosios europietiš-
kosios politikos ir kultūros tradicijos. 
Reikšminiai žodžiai: kultūra, Leitkultur, tauta, suverenitetas, valstybė, sąjunga.
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